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Abstract
Can a firm increase its workers’ effort by introducing competition through
performance-based ranking? On one hand such ranking can increase effort
because of individuals’ desire for status from high ranks, but on the other,
it can demotivate them or make them wary of outperforming peers. This
paper disentangles the effects of demotivation, social conformity, and status
associated with ranking through a randomized experiment at a Bangladeshi
sweater factory. Treated workers receive monthly information on their relative
performance either in private or in public. Both a simple theoretical framework
and empirical evidence from the field show that workers’ intrinsic desire to be
good at work induces privately ranked workers to increase effort upon receiving
positive feedback, but they get demotivated and decrease effort upon receiving
negative feedback. Public ranking lead to lower net effort relative to private
ranking because of a strong preference not to outperform friends. The negative
effects from demotivation and social conformity may explain why the existing
literature finds mixed evidence of impact of ranking workers.
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1 Introduction
A growing literature suggests that people can be motivated by status rewards, and
hence firms can increase the productivity of their workers by introducing compe-
tition among them through performance-based relative rankings. Both theoretical
research and empirical evidence advocate such a notion (e.g., Besley and Ghatak
[2008]; Vidal and Nossol [2011]; Ashraf et al. [2014a]). If this were true, it would be
extremely beneficial for firms since this practice can increase their productivity at
minimal cost. But if gains are to be had by introducing ranking at the workplace,
why don’t more firms do it? Is there more to ranking than the simple, positive
effect of status concerns?
In this paper, I argue that there are at least two reasons that such rankings may
lead to reduced worker effort: One derives from a worker’s intrinsic motivation for
status. A worker who receives information about his relative position may either
be motivated or demotivated, depending on whether he previously believed his
position to be higher or lower than shown by actual rankings.1 In turn, this can
lead to either an increase or a decrease in his effort. Second, in situations that
make ranks public, workers may also be subject to social concerns. As the result
of being known to others, higher rankings potentially generate higher social status.
At the same time, however, a worker who increases his rank imposes a negative
externality on the others whom he outperforms. So, the worker may internalize
this externality, and may reduce effort to avoid being seen as a self-serving person,
and to avoid risking being socially ostracized by co-workers, particularly those with
whom he has close interaction.2
This paper aims to disentangle the positive effects of status concerns from the
negative effects of demotivation and social conformity - all of which may affect
the productivity of workers when they are ranked by a firm.3 Disentangling these
effects poses empirical challenges. First, clear measures of individual performance
1Recent evidence has shown that workers can become demotivated from relative concerns (Breza
et al. [2018]).
2For instance, the theoretical literature on conformity (e.g., Akerlof [1997]; Bernheim [1994])
suggests that workers may not want to deviate too much away from their peers, lest they face
social punishment.
3I use the term conformity in a slightly weaker sense than is traditionally used in the literature.
In the literature, the term conformity refers to people’s urge to converge to a single point, whether
from below or above. In the context of this paper, however, converging to a rank from below is
observationally equivalent to pursuing status incentives, and hence, not empirically identifiable.
Hence, conformity can be observed only when it is convergence from above.
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must be available. Second, a distinction must be made between intrinsic and social
incentives. Third, to understand potential motivational and demotivational effects,
workers’ prior perceptions about how they rank in comparison with their co-workers
must be known. And finally, to test social conformity, a worker’s reference group,
the network of people with whom he may seek to conform, must be identified.
I overcome these challenges by conducting a randomized control trial experiment
in partnership with a leading sweater factory in Bangladesh, where I provided
workers with their performance-based ranks. I worked with a specific section in
the factory that employed 366 workers, all of whom received payment based on
individual production. This helps me to overcome the first empirical challenge.
I overcome the second challenge through a 10-month-long experiment with two
treatment groups. In the first group, Private Treatment, workers were told only
their own ranks, based on previous month’s performances. In the second, Public
Treatment, all the workers were told all rankings - both their own and those of other
workers in the Public Treatment. Workers in a given treatment group were ranked
among co-workers in the same treatment group. The two treatments, along with
a control group, allow me to separate the effects of intrinsic and social incentives.
Finally, to overcome the third and fourth challenges, a pre-intervention baseline
survey recorded workers’ own beliefs about what they expected their position to be
in the ranks and provided a detailed map of their social network.
I provide a simple theoretical framework to interpret the empirical design and
results. There are two key insights from the theoretical framework: First, how a
worker responds to the intervention because of intrinsic-status concerns depends
on the shape of the underlying intrinsic-status utility curve. If the status utility
from rank is convex, a positive feedback will motivate him to increase his effort.
This happens as the worker realizes that true marginal utility (now that he is at a
higher rank than he had expected) far outweighs the marginal cost of his effort. On
the other hand, a worker who receives a negative feedback will be demotivated and
decrease his effort. The predictions will be opposite if the status utility from rank
is concave. These predictions can be tested empirically to determine the shape
of the underlying status-utility curve. Second, while a Public Treatment worker
responds to intrinsic status concerns in the same way that a Private Treatment
worker does, a Public Treatment worker also responds to social incentives. He
faces two additional incentives, social status and social conformity. Relative to a
privately ranked worker, social-status incentive will induce the worker to increase
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effort in order to achieve a higher rank, but pressure to conform to peers may pull
his effort down instead. Hence, relative to a privately ranked worker, a publicly
ranked worker will exert more effort as long as he is ranked below the peers who
can socially punish him. If he is ranked above them, he will exert relatively less
(res. more) effort if the marginal disutility from outperforming peers is higher (res.
lower) than the marginal social-status utility.
There are two key empirical findings: First, the response of workers to the
private treatment depends on their prior beliefs about their relative positions, with
those actually ranked higher (res. lower) than their perceived ranks increasing (res.
decreasing) productivity. This suggests that, for these workers, the marginal return
to status is increasing with rank (status utility curve is convex). Workers who
received positive feedback in the first month of treatment performed more than
2.5 percentage points (p.p.) better than control-group workers who would have
received positive feedback had they been ranked. Workers who received negative
feedback, however, performed about 4 p.p. worse than those who received positive
feedback, and more than 1 p.p. worse than those in the control group. The gain in
productivity from one group was offset by the loss in another. Hence, the average
treatment effect was positive but statistically insignificant.
Second, making ranks public led to worse outcomes than in making them known
in private when workers were ranked higher than their friends. Workers in the
Public Treatment group who ranked higher than their friends (defined as workers
with whom they had social interaction outside the factory, as reported at baseline)
reduced their performance by more than 3 p.p. on average compared to those in the
Private Treatment group. This conformity occurred only with respect to friends and
not with respect to any other peer group, which is consistent with the hypothesis
that workers conform out of fear of social punishment. Once the response to social-
conformity incentives is accounted for, social status shows a small, positive, but
statistically insignificant effect. As a result, average effect of Public Treatment was
weakly worse than that of Private Treatment.
However, while negative feedback in the first treatment month had an overall
negative effect on workers, not all workers gave up and reduced effort. Conditional
on receiving negative feedback in the first month, workers showing more compet-
itive attitudes in a baseline laboratory-in-field experiment performed better after
the intervention. While non-competitive workers reduced their effort by about 3
p.p. in response to negative feedback, competitive workers performed about 4 p.p.
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better than them. This was true for both treatment groups. This serves as ad-
ditional evidence that workers cared about their ranks; it also underlines how the
same private-ranking treatment elicited opposite responses from different groups of
workers.
The subject of providing feedback to workers about their relative ranks has
attracted attention across a wide range of fields within economics, including man-
agement (Vidal and Nossol [2011]; Kuhnen and Tymula [2012]), education (Azmat
and Iriberri [2010]), and public policy (Ager et al. [2017]; Chetty et al. [2015]).4
Nevertheless, the results from this literature, especially that on firms, are conflicting
and remain far from conclusive.
Studies about private feedback on workers’ relative ranking within a firm docu-
ment a wide array of impacts. Vidal and Nossol [2011] find positive impact; Blader
et al. [2014] find zero impact; and Barankay [2011, 2012] finds negative impact.
However, the source of such variation in impact across these papers is unclear. A
possible clue lies in Breza et al. [2018]. From their experimental study, Breza et
al. find that workers become demoralized, and reduce effort when they realize that
they are paid relatively less than their peers. Can such a demoralization effect
explain negative effect from ranks? Possibly yes, but a priori it is not clear. In
the context of Breza et al., the demoralization effect stems from wage inequality,
which in their context, a worker cannot change. On the other hand, in case of
ranking, instead of reducing his effort upon receiving a negative feedback, a worker
may increase effort to try to achieve a higher relative position. A formal test of a
demoralization effect from ranks has not been done in existing papers.5
Studies with public ranking also find conflicting evidence of impacts. Ashraf
et al. [2014a] and Delfgaauw et al. [2013] find positive effects; Ashraf et al. [2014b]
and Blader et al. [2014] find negative effects; and Bandiera et al. [2013] find no effect.
Again, it remains unclear why the evidence is so mixed. The demoralization effect
remains one possible explanation; however, comparing the contexts in the papers
suggests a second possible mechanism. Delfgaauw et al. [2013] find a positive effect
from sales competitions among retail chain stores in Netherlands. On the other
hand, Bandiera et al. [2013] find zero effect from rank feedback among workers
at a fruit-picking farm who were living in the same quarters for a fair length of
4See Kluger and DeNisi [1996] for a discussion of findings in the field of psychology.
5Barankay [2011] does raise this issue in his working paper, but cannot provide definitive evi-
dence for the lack of data on workers’ prior beliefs about their ranks.
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time. A closer inspection reveals that the context in Bandiera et al. [2013] is
more conducive for deeper social ties and, hence, stronger incentives to internalize
negative externalities than in Delfgaauw et al. [2013].6 More direct clues lie in
Blader et al. [2014]. The study, which involved of truck drivers in a U.S. transport
company, took place when the company was in midst of a management intervention
that encouraged teamwork and collective effort. Blader and his co-authors find both
positive and negative effects of public ranks; positive effects came from sites where
the management intervention had not yet taken place, while the negative effects
came from sites that had received the intervention. The authors speculate that
the intervention may have reinforced social ties among drivers. But this is only a
conjecture; the role of social network in rank incentives has not been studied in
existing literature.
This paper contributes to the literature and provides new understanding about
the dynamics on rank incentives by proposing demotivation and social conformity
as two channels that can explain why existing empirical evidence is mixed. Ev-
idence on the demotivation effect found in this paper suggests that the average
effect of revealing true ranking information may be positive or negative, depending
on whether uninformed workers, on average, overestimate or underestimate their
relative performance. Also, the evidence on social conformity suggests that such
conformity can further negate positive effects from status motivation if rankings
are made public. This paper also contributes by separating intrinsic and extrinsic
incentives within public ranking. Except for Blader et al. [2014], existing studies
with public ranks do not make this distinction in incentives.
The findings from this paper also add to a few strands of broader literature.
As indicated earlier, the evidence of demotivation effect found in this paper relates
to the recent empirical literature on how relative concerns demoralize workers (e.g.
see Breza et al. [2018]; and Huet-Vaughn [2015]). This very idea that workers’
intrinsic relative-concerns can influence their economic decisions has also been ex-
plored in theoretical literature covering a wide array of contexts (e.g. Benabou and
Tirole [2002, 2003]; Contreras and Zanarone [2017]). The evidence on social con-
formity, on the other hand, relates to the literature on social incentives in presence
of externalities within firms. While studies of the effect of positive externalities on
6Bandiera et al. [2005] use a similar context (pickers at a fruit farm in the UK), and indeed
find that workers in this setting internalize negative externalities imposed through a relative pay
scheme.
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productivity are more common (e.g. Mas and Moretti [2009]), those with negative
externalities are relatively rare with one exception being Bandiera et al. [2005].
Bandiera et al. provide evidence that workers internalize negative externality they
impose on their peers when they are paid through a relative pay scheme. This
paper with rank incentives provides evidence that workers reduce effort even when
such externalities are non-monetary in nature. Another stream of related literature
is that on individuals’ social-image concerns in more general settings. Evidence of
such social-image concerns and conformity have been found in education (Bursztyn
and Jensen [2015]) and in laboratory experiments (Bursztyn et al. [2016]). See
Bursztyn and Jensen [2017] for a more detailed discussion on this literature.
In what follows, Section 2 describes the context and setup. Section 3 develops a
brief theoretical framework that provides analytical predictions of treatment effects.
Section 4 discusses the experimental design. Section 5 discusses the data, while
Section 6 discusses the empirical strategy and the main results. In Section 7, I
discuss alternative explanations to the findings in this paper. And finally, I conclude
in Section 8.
2 Background
The experiment was conducted in partnership with a leading sweater factory in
Bangladesh, and implemented in the Manual Knitting Section, one of three knitting
sections in the factory. In this section, which is situated on one single floor, workers
knit sweater parts using individually assigned manual knitting machines. All the
workers in this section produce similar output using almost identical capital input
(yarn, manual knitting machine, etc.).
Because the factory takes in multiple orders from multiple buyers at the same
time, the Manual Knitting Section can be working on multiple styles (and sizes) of
sweaters on a single day. Consequently, at a given point in time, different workers
(operators, as they are called at the factory) can be working on sweaters of the same
style and/or size, or different ones. These styles are assigned to them by distributors,
based on the production plan. The operators are divided into 15 administrative
groups called blocks, with each block supervised by one supervisor. The operators
are paid based on piece rates and receive their wages at the end of a production
month. The complexity of the sweater parts and the corresponding piece rates may
vary across styles. A typical sweater contains various knitted components: a front
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panel, a back panel, and two sleeves. Usually, an operator is assigned to produce a
batch of 12 complete sets of sweater panels. For a style of average complexity, the
batch will take a worker around one day to complete.
Three attributes of this Section make it an appropriate setting for the empirical
exercise in this paper:
Piece-rate pay. The process of individual production in this setting makes it
easy to measure individual productivity.
No promotion opportunities. Operators can move up to the next level, to
become supervisors; but because the average take-home wage of a good operator
is usually higher than the supervisors’ salaries, operators choose to be supervisors
only when their productivity falls with age.7 This rules out the possibility that any
ranking intervention would induce the workers to rank well for extrinsic incentives
such as promotion.
Workers with long tenures. Among the 366 operators working in this Section
at the beginning of the experiment in January 2016, most had been working at the
factory for more than six years, which potentially helped them to form expectations
of their own ranks, and also to form close social ties with their peers. Evidence of
these were also found in a baseline survey conducted prior to the intervention in
this paper.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section I develop a simple theoretical framework to examine how a worker
responds to rank incentives once such incentives are introduced by a firm. To keep
the theoretical framework simple, let us consider only two periods t ∈ {0, 1}. In
t = 0 there are no explicit rank information available; the worker has only a noisy
signal of his relative performance. In t = 1 the firm releases the workers’ true ranks
based on performance in t = 0.
3.1 Intrinsic Status Concerns
I start by first considering the case where there are no social concerns and workers
are driven by only intrinsic status concerns. This utility is intrinsic because it stems
from the worker’s intrinsic motivation to be good at whatever he does; there are no
7For instance, in January 2016, the average take-home pay of the 15 supervisors on the floor
was less than that of a worker in the 33rd percentile.
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extrinsic incentives involved. I will introduce social concerns in the next section.
To be concrete, worker i in period t chooses effort eit to maximize his utility Uit(.)
given by the following:
Uit(.) = W (e˜it)− C(eit, αi) +H
(
zit(.)
)
(1)
All the functions W (.), C(.), and H(.) are continuously differentiable at least
twice. W (e˜it) is utility gained from wage earned through effective effort e˜it. Effec-
tive effort e˜it = eit + it is the sum of effort exerted by worker eit and an individual
specific and time-variant shock to effort, it. This shock, observed privately by
worker only after choosing eit, can be interpreted as task specific characteristics or
instances that change the yield of effort. it is i.i.d, it ∼ g(), where g() is the
PDF for  ∈ (−∞,∞), and E(it) = 0. W1(.) > 0 and W11(.) ≤ 0.
C(eit, αi) is cost of effort exerted by worker i with skill level αi ∈ (0, α¯]. Higher
α implies higher skill. C1(.) > 0 and C11(.) > 0. In addition, C12(.) < 0 for eit > 0.
That is, marginal cost of effort is lower for higher skilled workers at any positive
level of effort. Also, C1(0) = 0.
H(.) represents intrinsic status utility derived from the worker’s perceived rank,
zit(.), which is given by:
zit =
[
e˜i,t − 1
n
∑
j
e˜j,t
]
+ δit (2)
The expression inside the braces is worker’s true rank, computed as the distance
between his effective effort and the mean effective effort of all workers, n in total.
However, the worker only observes this rank with a noise δit. δi0 ∈ (−∞,∞); but
δi1 = 0 for all workers, since they all find out about their true ranks in t = 1.
Note that, δi0 > 0 implies that the worker overestimates his rank in period t = 0,
while δi0 < 0 implies that he underestimates it; δi0 = 0 implies that he observes it
perfectly.
Higher the perceived rank, higher is the utility from status; hence H1(.) > 0.
Also note that, the rank a worker i achieves increases with his own effective effort
e˜it, but decreases with that of others e˜−i,t.
One simplifying assumption on zit(.) is that it is linear in worker’s own effort
and that of others, and thus the effect of marginal effort on rank is constant. It
is because since I observe changes in only effort, I cannot separate the effect of
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marginal effort on H(.) from that on the underlying rank function. So, I cannot
identify the shapes of these two functions at the same time. Nonetheless, the
main intuition behind the results will be the same even with a more generic rank
function.8
The worker chooses eit to maximize his expected utility. Using Leibneiz rule
and the fact that ∂e˜it∂eit = 1, we get the following first order condition:∫ [
W1(e˜it) +
n− 1
n
H1(zit)
]
g(it)dit − C1(eit, αi) = 0 (3)
At the very beginning of t = 1, the firm releases precise information on ranks of
all the workers based on their performance in t = 0. Assuming an interior solution9,
we have the following observation for a worker’s response in t = 1.
OBSERVATION 1: If H11(.) > 0, a worker who underestimates his rank in
t = 0 (δi0 < 0) increases his effort in t = 1, while a worker who overestimates his
rank (δi0 > 0) decreases his effort in t = 1. Conversely, if H11(.) < 0, the opposite
happens.
In other words, when intrinsic status utility from perceived rank is convex, a
worker who has inaccurate rank information in t = 0 but receives positive (res.
negative) feedback from true rank information increases (res. decreases) his effort
in t = 1. Conversely, when intrinsic status utility from perceived rank is concave,
a worker who receives positive (res. negative) feedback from true rank information
decreases (res. increases) his effort in t = 1. The proof is in the Appendix.
Intuitively, a worker increases his effort if true rank information from the firm
reveals that his marginal status utility from an additional unit of effort is higher
than he thought; he decreases effort if it is the converse. But whether it is the pos-
itive feedback or negative feedback that revises his marginal status utility upward
depends on the shape of the underlying status utility curve.
In the empirical framework, I will use Observation 1 to test both the existence
and the curvature of H(.).
8However, a key assumption made in Equation 2 is that the noise in perceived rank of a worker
is additively separable from his true rank. On the contrary, if δit had entered zit in a multiplicative
form for instance, a fixed δit would introduce a higher magnitude of distortion at a higher rank
than at a lower rank; this would have been a much stronger assumption to make.
9For an interior solution I need the following assumption: E[W11(.) + (
n−1
n
)2H11(.)] < C11(.)
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3.2 Social Concerns
Now I introduce social concerns into the worker’s utility. Such concerns relate
to how a worker wants to be perceived by his peers or other people around him
(extrinsic). Conditional on rank of workers being known to each other, a worker
now also gets utility from his social image associated with his rank. There are
two types of social image he may care about. The first is his social image as a
good worker (i.e. social status) associated with a higher rank. This induces him to
increase effort to earn higher rank. However, since a rank tournament is a zero-sum
game, a higher rank for one worker means a lower rank for another. Hence, effort
of one worker now imposes a negative externality on other workers; if he increases
effort to earn higher rank he damages his social image as a good person or friend,
the second type of social image that he cares about.10 In fear of being taken as
a self-serving person by his peers, a worker may despise getting ranked high, and
either not increase effort, or in extreme cases, reduce effort to socially conform to
that of his peers.
To introduce this trade-off between social status and social conformity, I revise
the previous utility function of a worker to the following:
Uit = W (e˜it)− C(eit, αi) +H(zit) + γitsiH(zit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social status
−piitM(e˜i,t−1 − e˜fi,t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social conformity
(4)
Now, social image concerns introduce a social-status component to the utility
by augmenting intrinsic status function H(.) with a factor γitsi. γit represents
visibility of i’s rank to others - the more visible his rank is to others, stronger is
the social status that he derives from his rank.
The last component, M(.), in Equation 4 refers to the disutility worker i gets
when his effort is higher than the effort of peers who can socially punish him (let
us call these peers friends). This disutility can come from either real punishment
or simply his fear of punishment. Effort of these friends is denoted by e˜f . Also,
M(x) = M1(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0. However, this disutility increases with the extent of
outperformance; so, M1(x) > 0 for x > 0. Since this is a cost of effort, I assume
M11(.) > 0.
Because of the required condition of visibility, γit = piit = 1 when ranks are
10The worker cares about his image as a good person or friend since this can yield benefits, either
monetary (e.g. borrowing money) or non-monetary (e.g. good company during work breaks).
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public in t > 0 and γit = piit = 0 otherwise.
11 There are two simplifying assumptions
about γit. First, visibility of ranks is same for all workers and workers do not affect
this visibility. This is solely because I intend to focus on changes in effort of workers
rather than their behaviour in sharing information. Second, visibility of ranks is
zero unless there is a formal public ranking introduced by the firm.
Note that, when rank information are kept private, the above framework with
social concerns degenerates to the previous framework with only intrinsic status
incentives. When ranks are public on the other hand, assuming an interior solu-
tion12, we have the following observation.
OBSERVATION 2: Let x = e˜i,0 − e˜fi,0 be the difference between a worker’s own
effective effort and that of his friend(s). Worker i exerts more effort in t = 1 under
public ranking than under private ranking if x ≤ 0. More generally, there exists a
value x˜ > 0 such that, worker i exerts more effort in t = 1 under public ranking
than under private ranking if x < x˜. Alternatively, he exerts less effort in t = 1
under public ranking than under private ranking if x > x˜.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition is the following. When rank infor-
mation are made public, the visibility of ranks increases, which in turn introduces
social-status utility attached to ranks. Making ranks public, however, also switches
on public shaming for low-ranked workers. This introduces disutility from ranking
higher than friends. But when a worker is not ranked higher than his friends, he
responds positively to social-status incentives, and increase effort relative to under
private ranking. On the contrary, when his rank distance with his friends is too
high, the marginal disutility from outperforming friends overtakes marginal utility
from social-status; so, he decreases effort.
4 The Experiment
4.1 The Design
The intervention for the randomized experiment provided treated workers with
relative ranks through individually addressed letters at the end of every month, for
11Also, I assume that the workers expect the ranks to continue beyond t = 1. This lets workers
respond to social conformity in t = 1.
12For an interior solution, I need the following assumption: for any given i, ∂
2M(.)
∂e2it
> si
∂2H(.)
∂e2it
.
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nine months. The control group also received letters, but no information on ranks.
The content of these letters is discussed in Section 4.4.
There were two treatment groups. The first, Private Treatment Group, received
letters that informed workers of only their own ranks, and no one else’s; the ranks
were computed among workers in this treatment group only. Because the ranks
were private, no extrinsic incentives were involved.13 Hence, the Private Treatment
allows me to understand how revelation of true ranking information affects workers
because of their intrinsic status incentives alone. Conversely, the second treatment
group, the Public Treatment Group, received ranking information in such a way
that the ranks of all workers were made known to each other; again, these ranks
were computed among workers in this treatment group only. The second treatment
induced response from intrinsic status concerns just as the first did, but because
the ranks were now public, this also induced response to social concerns.
In terms of the theoretical framework, the experiment does the following. By
revealing information on true ranks to Private and Public Treatment workers, the
experiment eliminates δi0 from their perceived ranks. zit(.) is now redefined as the
following:
zit(.) =
[
e˜i,t − 1
n
∑
j
e˜j,t
]
+ δi0(1− vit)
where treatment status vit = 1 for Private and Public Treatment workers in t > 0,
and vit = 0 otherwise. On the other hand, γit = 1 for Public Treatment workers in
t > 0, and γit = 0 otherwise.
Thus, the goal is to identify the presence and impact of intrinsic status incen-
tives H(zit) by experimentally changing the value of perceived ranks zit(.) among
treated workers. γit and piit are set to zero by making information on ranks private
in Private Treatment (and thus switching off social concerns), and set to one by
making rank information public in Public Treatment (and thus switching on so-
cial concerns). Any differential response in Private Treatment, relative to Control
group, will be driven by changes in intrinsic status incentives induced by changes in
perceived rank zit(.). Any differential effect in Public Treatment, relative to Private
Treatment, will be driven by the two social concerns.
13A valid concern here is that workers in the Private Treatment group may have shared rank
information among themselves, essentially opening up the door to extrinsic incentives. I will discuss
this issue in Section 7.
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I used a baseline survey before the intervention to collect information on what
each worker expected his rank to be. The difference between his expected rank and
his true rank provides a measure of δi0.
Next, to disentangle social-status and social conformity effects, I compiled a
detailed map of the existing social network at baseline, including information on
who a worker socialized with outside the factory, who he talked to within the factory,
and the administrative block to which he belonged. Potentially, any of these, along
with the whole workforce on the floor, could define a worker’s reference group to
which he might conform.
Now, we may be particularly concerned with spill-over from Public Treatment
to Private Treatment, since the former might induce a norm of sharing information
in the latter, making the latter less private. Anecdotal evidence from the factory
indicated that the workers were more closely connected socially to workers within
their own blocks; hence a block encompassed most of a worker’s peer connections,
regardless of how those connections are defined (e.g. social proximity vs. spatial
proximity). To check if there was any spill-over effect, the treatments were stratified
across blocks. Before randomly assigning workers into experimental arms, first I
randomly selected all 15 blocks of the floor into one of two categories, which I
refer to as Category A and Category B. In Category A, 43.33% of operators were
assigned to Private Treatment and 23.33% to Public Treatment. In Category B,
the public/private weights were reversed. The control group consisted of one-third
of the block operators in all blocks; and overall in the whole floor, one-third of
operators were in each of the two experimental groups. The stratification created
an exogenous block-level variation in the exposure each treatment group had to the
other, and helps to identify potential spill-over effects from one treatment group to
the other.
Following random assignment of the blocks into the two categories, we14 held a
public lottery within each block. A public lottery eliminated the possibility of be-
havioral responses stemming from suspicions on how they became inducted into one
group and not another, but it precluded stratifying treatment on any characteristics
other than block.
The top panel of Table 1 shows the final distribution of operators across exper-
imental arms. The control group consisted of 125 workers, the Private Treatment
14I switch to ”we” to include the field team members of this study.
14
of 117 workers, and the Public Treatment group consisted of 124 workers.15
We told the operators that their performance ranks would neither be rewarded
nor punished in any way, monetary or non-monetary. To the extent that the op-
erators might not have believed our assurances, the mechanisms of intrinsic and
social concerns get confounded. However, note that even if such beliefs existed,
they would have existed only in the first months of the treatment, after which
workers would have realized that no such external punishments or rewards were
forthcoming. Continuing the treatment for 10 months allows me to check whether
such expectations could matter.
4.2 Timeline
In October 2015, we conducted a baseline survey; then, in January 2016, we drafted
366 available workers into experimental groups. It was also only during the draft-
ing that we first informed the workers about the intervention that would follow.
Because the top management also wanted to introduce ranking of workers, the ex-
periment was introduced as a new management practice to the floor, rather than
as an experiment by an external group of researchers. We delivered the first set of
treatment letters in early February 2016, and the final set in early October 2016.
At no point did we mention an end date to the experiment.
4.3 Rank Calculation
We computed the ranks provided to treatment workers in five steps. First, for
each style and size produced by a worker in the previous month, we computed an
average production time per set of sweater parts. In the second step, we compared
this average time with the time put in by all the other workers in the same treatment
group who also worked on the same style and size, to compute a style-rank for each
style and size; a higher numerical rank would imply a worse performance. In the
third step, for each worker, we normalized each of all the worker’s style-ranks by
the highest rank value for each of those styles (the worst rank in the treatment
group). In the fourth step, we weighted the normalized-style ranks by the share
of a given style in the worker’s total production in the previous month. Then, we
summed all the normalized-and-weighted-style ranks for each worker, to produce a
15A slight deviation from one-third of operators in each arm resulted from rounding up of the
number of operators for each group in each block.
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weighted average of normalized-style ranks. Finally, in the fifth step, we produced
a final rank for each worker by comparing this weighted average of style ranks with
that of others in the same treatment group.16
Because the information on the actual production times was recorded at the
Distribution Section, the workers had no access to this information. Nonetheless,
there could be concerns that because the workers were paid on piece rates, infor-
mation on total production wages could help them deduce their ranks even when
they were not meant to. However, wage-based ranks would not predict time-based
ranks for two reasons. First, wages depended on the piece rates, which in turn,
varied across styles. The workers were also aware that the piece rates did not al-
ways reflect the complexity or production time of a given style. Second, in a typical
month, a worker worked on four different styles, which did not necessarily overlap
with other workers. Moreover, in calculating production time we excluded pre-
authorized leaves, but included all unauthorized absences in between a batch being
assigned and the batch not yet submitted. Additionally, in computing the ranks
we excluded production of small supplementary parts that were produced in large
batches but not shared between a large number of workers. All these helped to
distance wage-based ranks from time-based ranks. The treatment letters contained
details about how ranks were calculated.
Figure 1 shows how wage-based ranks and time-based ranks correlate with each
other. Because both are measures of productivity, they should be positively corre-
lated, as indeed they are. Nonetheless, there is also sufficient noise for wage-based
rank not to be able to precisely predict time-based rank.
Additionally, following Barankay [2012] I provided workers with information on
what ranks they could achieve if they improved their average production time by
5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent. This gave them an idea of how harder they
would need to work to achieve better ranks, but they would not be able to use this
information to compare themselves with workers from a different treatment group.
4.4 The Treatment Letters
As stated earlier, we delivered information on ranks to the treated workers through
monthly letters. Prior to the intervention, the factory did not record the precise
time a job was distributed and received. The factory started recording the time only
16In the rare instances when two or more workers had the same value for weighted average
style-ranks, we gave them the same final rank.
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for the intervention. To control for any potential responses from the time-keeping
or receiving the letters, all the workers in the control group also received letters
at the end of every production month. These letters contained trivial information
such as the total of number of sweaters the worker produced, broken down into
styles, total time taken to produce them, and a list of all the workers in the control
group.
On the other hand, each worker in the Private Treatment group received a
letter with the same information as those in the control group, plus his relative
rank among all the workers in the Private Treatment group, the total number of
workers as well as the lowest rank in the group, and what the worker’s rank would
have been had he improved his time by 5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent,
ceteris paribus.
Each worker in the Public Treatment Group received the same information as
those in the Private Treatment group, except that for the former, the names of all
the other workers in the Public Treatment group appeared with their respective
ranks; this rank was also the variable by which we sorted the list.
To sum up, the difference between the control group and the treatment groups
lies in the additional ranking information received, while the difference between the
two treatment groups (Private and Public) lies in whether or not other people also
knew about their ranks.
5 Data
The data I use for this paper come from two key sources: administrative data from
the factory, and a baseline survey conducted in October 2015 before we drafted
workers into the experiment.
5.1 Administrative Data
The administrative data from the factory provide detailed information on individ-
ual worker-level production wages, attendance, and breakdown of production into
sweater styles and corresponding quantities, all compiled at the month level. These
are available from January 2013 to October 2016. Starting from January 2016, we
also collected the time it took for each operator to complete each of his jobs; we
used this to compute the ranks.
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The second panel of Table 1 shows the mean values for monthly wage, total days
of attendance, average daily wage (total wage per attendance day, which I use as
the outcome variable for analysis), age, and tenure at the start of the experiment.
Columns 1-3 show the means for each experimental arm, while columns 4 and 5
show the difference in means between the control group and each of the treatment
groups. The groups appear well balanced on these characteristics.
5.2 Social Network
We mapped the social network of workers in multiple dimensions. One definition
of the network is simply the block to which a worker belongs. However, a more
relevant measure in the context of social conformity is the network that can impose
social punishments on a worker. Hence, we asked the workers to consider each of
the other workers in their block and tell us how frequently they talked to them and
whether they socialized with them outside the factory. With respect to the other
workers outside their blocks, we asked them to name 10 workers with whom they
talked frequently, or with whom they socialized17.
Figure 2 shows evidence consistent with anecdotal evidence; workers were so-
cially connected with an average of eight peers inside their block as opposed to
three from outside their block.18 The difference is starker when computed as a
share of total workers in the block or floor. Hence, for the rest of the paper, I will
focus on this within-block network.
The Social Network panel of Table 1 shows that the number of within-block
peers with whom a worker socialized outside the factory is well balanced across the
experimental groups. While there is slight imbalance in the number of block peers
with whom a worker conversed more than three days a week, all the other observed
characteristics are well balanced on average. An F-test of the social-network mea-
sures as a whole shows that they are jointly insignificant in predicting treatment
status either as a combined treatment group or as separate groups (Private and
Public).
17We did not ask about them individually because of the sheer size of the total workforce. Also,
anecdotal evidence suggested that they were friends mostly with workers from their own blocks.
18Conditional on naming fewer than 10 peers (which was the case for all but 16 workers), this
number is 2.74.
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6 Main Results
6.1 Average Treatment Effect
To take advantage of a long period of pre-intervention data I use a difference-in-
difference (DID) strategy to identify the treatment impact19. The key baseline
specification is:
Yit = c+ αi + τt + β(Treatmenti ∗ Postt) + λ′Xit + ηit (5)
where Yit is the outcome variable of interest, and almost always the logarithmic
transformation of mean daily wage20 earned by worker i in month t, and which I
use as the measure of worker productivity21; αi is worker fixed effect; τt is year-
month fixed effect; the DID estimate of treatment effect, β, is the key coefficient of
interest; and Xit is a vector of additional individual specific time-variant controls
that includes, depending on specifications, sweater style FE and monthly block
size.22
To keep with the standard approach in this literature, and to check how the
treatment effects in this paper compare to those found in the existing literature,
I start by estimating the average treatment effect of the intervention. Table 2
shows the baseline DID estimates of the average treatment effect. In columns 1
and 2, the treatment groups are pooled together. Column 1 is the simplest baseline
specification; column 2 introduces worker, year-month, and style fixed effects, as
well as block-size controls. Columns 3 and 4 correspond to columns 1 and 2,
respectively, but now split the treatment into Private and Public Treatment groups.
Regardless of specifications, columns 1-4 show that, on average, the treatments had
no effect. Not only are the estimates statistically insignificant, they are also small
in magnitude. A small statistically-insignificant difference emerges between Private
and Public Treatment effects, indicating that the workers in the Public Treatment
might have performed worse than those in the Private; we will explore this more
19An alternative would be Ancova analysis (McKenzie [2012]), but variance calculations show
that DID and Ancova analysis are equally efficient with the data in this context.
20It is calculated as monthly wage divided by total number of attendance days.
21Conversely, the average time a worker takes to produce a sweater would be a more precise
measure of productivity (which is what was used to compute ranks), but these times are not
available for the pre-intervention period.
22Also, I exclude some 95 workers who were hired in the middle of the intervention, because of
the concern that they may respond differently to the intervention than the others.
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later.
The finding of an overall zero average treatment effect, particularly from Pri-
vate Treatment, is similar to that found in studies such as Blader et al. [2014].
But, does this arise because the workers did not care about the ranks at all, or
were there heterogeneous responses that offset each other? Indeed, the theoretical
framework of this paper suggested that the treatment effect would be heteroge-
neous depending on the nature of feedback. Such heterogeneous responses could
potentially offset each other and lead to an overall zero effect. So, in the following
section, I empirically test theoretical Observation 1.
6.2 Treatment Effect from Intrinsic Status Concerns
As noted in Section 4, during the baseline survey prior to intervention, we asked
workers what they thought their ranks were among all the workers in the whole
knitting section. After we randomly grouped them into their corresponding exper-
imental groups, the reported ranks, normalized with respect to the sizes of their
experimental groups, serve as an estimation of the ranks they would expect to re-
ceive from the treatment (their Expected Ranks). Ex post, we revealed their true
ranks to them in the first month of treatment. The difference between expected
ranks and true ranks as seen on the treatment letter is the “surprise” the work-
ers received. Hence, this difference serves as a measure of δi0 from the theoretical
framework. A positive difference δi0 > 0 for a given worker would imply that the
worker had overestimated his rank earlier, and then received negative feedback from
the treatment; a negative difference δi0 < 0 would imply the opposite.
It is worth noting one fine point. When we asked a worker about his expected
rank during the baseline survey, we asked him to rank himself based on the wages of
the previous three months. On the other hand, the ranks in treatment letters were
computed from actual production time in immediate previous month. Nonetheless,
because rank based on long-term average wages (three months in this context) is a
fairly precise measure of productivity, it is reasonable to assume that the expected
rank from the baseline survey nonetheless reflects the rank that the worker would
expect to receive in the treatment letters. Indeed, distribution of δi0 computed as a
difference between expected rank and true wage rank at baseline looks very similar
to that computed as a difference between expected rank and time-based rank from
the first treatment letter ; it is shown in Figure 3.
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Table 3 shows the empirical test of Observation 1. I focus only on the Control
and Private Treatment groups to understand intrinsic status concerns because, in
the Public Treatment group, social concerns muddle the mechanism.23 The workers
are now split into two subsets. Column 1 refers to all the workers who received
positive feedback through the treatment letter in the first month. Column 2 refers to
those who instead received negative feedback.24 Control-group workers are similarly
split into these categories. The control-group workers never received any ranking
information in practice, but I can nonetheless compute their ranks and, hence, the
feedback they would have received had they also been treated. Control subsets
serve as more appropriate counterfactuals than the whole control group because
they control for any unobserved characteristics that determine whether a worker
underestimates or overestimates his rank. Also, note that there is no statistical
difference between pre-intervention wages of private- and control-group workers,
even after splitting the workers into the two subsets.
The first row of Table 3 shows that there was indeed a differential response to
the type of feedback received by workers. Workers who were told that their effort
yielded much more (intrinsic) status return than they had previously expected
increased effort by about 2.5 p.p., while those who were told that the return was
lower than they had previously expected decreased effort by a little more than
1 p.p. However, the difference between the two coefficients is more important.
The difference in these coefficients reported in column 3 is almost 4 p.p. in size
and statistically significant. I do the same analysis in columns 4–6, but include
additional controls. The results are similar.
The findings in Table 3 provide support to this paper’s theoretical framework
in two ways. First, the fact that we see a differential response to feedback suggests
that workers do respond to changes in their perceived rank, zit, that were induced
by the experiment. Implicitly, this validates the presence of the function H(.) in
worker’s utility function; that is, workers do care about intrinsic status. Second,
the fact that workers responded positively to positive feedback and negatively to
negative feedback suggests that the underlying status utility from ranks is convex
23The results for Private Treatment are almost identical when Public Treatment workers are
also included in the sample.
24The fact that there were more workers who had previously overestimated their ranks (n=139)
than who had previously underestimated their ranks (n=82) reflects the distribution plots in
Figure 3. Also, this is consistent with findings in existing literature that suggest that people
usually overestimate their own performance (e.g. Svenson [1981]; Meyer [1975]).
21
in nature, that is H11(.) > 0.
25 Because different workers respond in two opposite
directions, the net average treatment effect is close to zero, as was seen in Table 2.
6.3 Treatment Effect from Social Concerns
Let us now try to understand the treatment effect in Public Treatment. Public
Treatment differs from Private in that it introduces social concerns in addition to
intrinsic-status concerns. Social concerns, in turn, consist of both social-status and
social conformity incentives. To disentangle the latter two, I first check whether
there were indeed preferences for such conformity in the Public Treatment group. If
a worker faced social pressure to conform to his peers, we would expect the worker
to reduce effort when he found himself ranked relatively better than his peers who
were also in the Public Treatment group. But who were the peers with whom he
would care to conform?
Giving in to conformity pressure and reducing effort is costly to the workers.
Because they were paid piece rates, reduced effort also implied reduced income.
So, for a worker to conform in effort, the return he would receive from conforming
would have to offset the income he would lose. Therefore, a strong candidate for
the reference group are the co-workers with whom a worker socialized (i.e., friends
of the worker), because they had the power to impose social costs on him should
his ranking shame them. Hence, if there were any effect from conformity, it would
be strongest with respect to friends.
If the social pressure to conform was present, we expect it to be felt by work-
ers who were relatively more productive than their friends from the same block
and the same treatment (henceforth high-productive), and not so much by those
who were relatively less productive (henceforth low-productive). This is precisely
what I test in Table 4. Column 1 is simply average treatment effect in the two
treatment groups. In Column 2, I test how publicly ranked high-productive and
low-productive workers responded after the introduction of the treatment. To do
this, I split the publicly ranked workers into two groups - workers whose baseline
productivity (average daily wage from the whole pre-treatment period) was higher
than the median among their friends in the same block and same treatment, and
workers whose baseline productivity was lower than the median.
25Inadequate sample size prevents me from testing whether there is a point of inflection in the
underlying status utility curve.
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Indeed, in Column 2 we see that publicly ranked low-productive workers in-
creased their effort following the introduction of the intervention. Compared to
them, high-productive workers decreased their effort by about six p.p. Also, it is
not only that these high-productive workers decrease their effort compared to low-
productive workers in the Public Treatment group, the net effort from the former
set of workers is also less than similar workers in the control group. This is shown
by the sum of Rows B and D at the bottom of the table.
If this behaviour among high-productive workers was induced by making the
ranks public, we would not expect to see this in the Private Treatment. When we do
the same exercise with Private Treatment in Column 3, we do not indeed see any
such decrease in effort from privately ranked high-productive workers. However,
to interpret this decrease in effort in Public Treatment as social-conformity effect,
we should deduct the response by similar workers in Private Treatment. This is
shown by the sum of Rows (B+D) - (A+C) at the bottom of the table, which is
also negative and statistically significant. Finally, these results are also robust to
including additional controls, as evident from Column 4.
Table 4 shows conformity with respect to baseline productivity. But how did
these workers respond to actual rank information? This I test in Table 5.
If the social pressure to conform was present, then it would switch on when a
worker is ranked higher than his friends. Hence, as a proxy for this social pressure
to conform, I use a time-variant dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, in a
given month, the worker found out that he was ranked higher than the median of
all ranks among the his friends (in the same Treatment) in the previous month.26
As before, to ensure that I use appropriate counterfactuals for treated workers,
I also assign ranks to control group workers, and compute their rank distances
from their friends (in the control group). This helps to control for control group
workers who are of similar distances from their friends. Further, along with worker
fixed effects and year-month fixed effects, I also use style fixed effects to control for
variation in wage from style-specific characteristics. Table 5 shows the results.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that, on average, a worker in Public Treatment,
relative to a similar control-group worker, reduced effort by about 3 p.p. when the
worker was ranked higher than the median of his friends in the previous month
(sum of rows B and D). Also, to account for intrinsic responses we need to deduct
26Notice that using previous month’s rank information also allows me to work around Manski’s
reflection problem (Manski [1993]).
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response by similar workers in the Private Treatment. The net effect, shown at the
bottom of the table, is negative and statistically significant. In other words, once
a Public Treatment worker found out that he had ranked higher than his friends
in the previous month, he reduced his effort by about 2.8 p.p. relative to a Private
Treatment worker.27
Alternatively, conformity could also be tested using a continuous measure of
rank distance with friends instead of a dummy variable as used in column 1 of
Table 5. Using a continuous measure of rank distance with friends yields similar
results, and shows that the reduction in effort from workers in Public Treatment was
more when they are ranked incrementally higher than their friends (i.e. M1(.) > 0),
but there were no such effect when they were ranked lower than their friends (i.e.
M(x) = 0 when x ≤ 0). These results are omitted for brevity.
To reconcile results from conformity to that from information shocks, in columns
2 and 3 I again split the workers into two subsets based on the feedback they
received. We see similar differential responses to feedback (column 4) from Public
Treatment as we saw from Private Treatment in Table 3.
Regarding conformity, we find that Public Treatment responded more strongly
to conformity pressure even when we split workers based on the type of feedback
they received, as is shown by the sum of Rows (E+H)-(A+D) at the bottom of
the table. Also, the difference is larger in the case where workers received positive
feedback.
Finally, what about social status? Now that we have captured conformity
through a dummy variable that switches on when a worker ranks above his friends,
Public*Post captures the response when he is not ranked better than his friends. In
other words, the Public*Post coefficient captures response to intrinsic-status moti-
vations (just like in Private*Post) and response to social-status incentives, but not
social conformity. Therefore, the difference between Public*Post and Private*Post
coefficients should be driven by social-status incentives. Returning to column 1
which includes all workers, I find that the effect from social status is positive, but
very small and statistically insignificant. Social-status effect is similar in columns
2 and 3 - the differences in Public*Post and Private*Post coefficients are positive
but statistically insignificant.
27Note that the conformity effect with respect to distances from friends’ rankings is net of
positive status incentives that might also be at work specifically within the network of friends. To
that extent, the conformity effect we are capturing is only underestimated.
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Note that, while Public Treatment workers who were not ranked higher than
their friends exert only weakly more effort than Private Treatment worker, Public
Treatment workers who were ranked higher than their friends exert significantly less
effort than similar Private Treatment workers. In other words, social-conformity
effect outweighs social-status effect in the Public Treatment.
Finally, is this conformity behaviour really driven by fear of reciprocation from
one’s social network? In column 5 of Table 5, I check how the workers responded to
getting ranked higher than the median of all the other workers from the same block,
who were also in the same treatment, but with whom a worker did not socialize
outside the factory. The results on conformity to friends still exist (row D), but no
such conformity took place with respect to the others (row F).
I repeat the exercise in column 5 by defining the second reference group as
either (same block and same treatment) peers of similar productivity but with
whom a worker did not socialize with28, or (same block and same treatment) peers
with whom a worker talked inside the factory but with whom the worker did not
socialize outside the factory. The results are similar as in column 5, and hence not
reported.
Thus, while the Public Treatment workers did exhibit conformity to their friends,
they did not show any such behavior with respect to other workers in their block.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that a worker would reduce effort to inter-
nalize negative externality on peers who can socially punish the worker if he tries
to consistently shame them through ranks.29 Since other workers who are not his
friends do not have any strong way to inflict social punishment, the worker does
not internalize the negative externality he imposes on them.
6.4 Dynamic Effect
Previous analysis explored how workers responded to the feedback that they re-
ceived in the first month. But was it consistent across all treated months? To
check dynamic responses to ranking information, I first check how Private Treat-
ment workers, conditional on receiving a certain type of feedback in the first treat-
28For a given worker, a peer is defined as of similar productivity if the peer’s pre-intervention
productivity was within the 25 percentile band of the worker’s own productivity.
29Alternatively, they could also do so for altruistic reasons if they felt guilty about their friends
ranking worse than them. Although this alternative reason cannot be ruled out entirely, the fact
that we do not see any reduction in effort from positive feedback in Private Treatment indicates
that altruism is less likely.
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ment month, behaved in subsequent months. I consider only Private Treatment
since the effect from information is not muddled by social concerns in this treat-
ment. Figure 4 shows that, conditional on receiving a negative feedback in the first
month of treatment, a treated worker consistently reduced effort in all the subse-
quent treatment months (relative to the control group). Conversely, conditional on
receiving a positive feedback in the first month, a worker consistently performed
better in all the subsequent months.
It is not surprising that a worker’s response to the first feedback is consistent
across all treatment months. A worker’s response would vary across months if he
learned something new from latest feedback. While the information on true rank
in the first feedback letter carried enough new information to update a worker’s
perceived rank, subsequent information was likely to be similar to that received
in the first letter, and, hence, carried little new information. A formal analysis
bears out this hypothesis. The correlation between workers’ true ranks in February
2016 were only weakly correlated with the workers’ expected ranks, while the ranks
in March 2016 were highly correlated with those from February 2016 (correlation
coefficients of 0.33 and 0.68 respectively). Ranks in subsequent months are similarly
correlated.
I also check how, over time, workers responded to changes in their ranks across
the previous two treatment letters. There were very little response to changes in
their ranks across months30.
6.5 Further Tests and Discussions
The evidence presented so far suggests that a worker who received a negative feed-
back in the first treatment month became demotivated and reduced his effort in all
subsequent treatment months. Why did he not work harder to achieve his perceived
rank, instead?
In order to answer the above question, during the baseline survey, we imple-
mented a laboratory-in-the-field game to capture workers’ innate competitive na-
ture, thus capturing their willingness to be ranked. In that game, we gave workers
10 ping-pong balls and asked them to throw the balls one at a time into a basket
placed 2.5 metres away. We told them they would be paid for each successful shot
they made. However, they could choose to be paid through one of two different
30Results are available upon request.
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methods - either a fixed piece rate for each successful shot, or double that rate
but only if the worker scored more than a randomly chosen peer.31 We asked the
worker to select one of the two payment methods only after he saw the setup of the
game, so that he could make an informed decision about which payment he wanted
to select. We told the worker that his competitor would be picked only after all
the workers had played the game, and only then would we decide who had won.
Thus, the worker would not know with whom he would be compared. Among 363
workers surveyed, 198 chose the first version, and 165 chose the competitive version
of the game. The numbers of workers choosing one or the other version of the game
were also balanced between the experimental arms, as shown in Table 1. In the
following analysis, I consider the workers who chose the second scheme as having
a more competitive attitude than those who did not. If workers cared about their
status, workers who were more competitive in nature would perform better than
those who were not. This is precisely what we see in Table 6.
In Table 6, Treatment*Post coefficients refer to responses by less- or non-
competitive workers, while (Treatment*Post + Treatment*Post*Competitive) tells
us the responses of competitive workers. Column 1 shows that competitive workers
responded more positively than those who were not competitive. The interaction
terms are positive in both treatments, but statistically significant only for Pub-
lic Treatment. When split into subsets of workers in the next two columns based
on the type of feedback received by the workers, a clearer pattern emerges. The
difference between competitive and non-competitive workers is stark for workers
who received negative feedback, and is almost identical between the two treat-
ments. Non-competitive workers reduced their effort upon receiving negative feed-
back while competitive workers did not give up so easily; in fact, the latter workers
marginally increased their effort compared to control group (rows F and G). Among
the workers who received positive feedback, competitive ones increased their effort
compared with non-competitive ones, but the differences are not as stark. This is
perhaps because being competitive or not is unlikely to make a significant difference
when workers find out that they performed better than what they had expected.
The discussion of the differences between Private Treatment and Public Treat-
ment has so far considered only social status and conformity. However, compared
to Private Treatment, Public Treatment not only made a given worker’s rank vis-
31This game is similar to laboratory or laboratory-in-field games used in existing literature to
measure an individual’s competitive attitude. For example, see Gneezy et al. [2009].
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ible to others (and thus introducing social concerns), it also allowed him to know
about others’ true ranks. Hence, there was more information in public ranks than
in private. Could having more accurate knowledge of peers’ relative ranks drive
any of the results we saw in Public Treatment?
To check whether such learning mattered, we asked each worker during the
baseline survey to compare his own wages (from the previous three months) to
those of each of the other workers in the same block. To represent new knowledge
that was created from knowing peers’ ranks in Public Treatment, I use the number
of peers whose ranks (in the previous month) were different than a worker’s beliefs
about his position at baseline. More specifically, this new knowledge realized when
peers that a worker had thought were comparatively less productive in fact ranked
higher than him in the previous month, or the converse.
Table 7 shows the results from this analysis. For Public Treatment in column 1,
the only information shock that seemed to matter surfaced when workers discovered
that, contrary to their expectations, their peers ranked lower than themselves. To
check how much of this is driven by conformity to friends, in columns 2, as before,
I include a dummy to indicate whether or not a worker was ranked higher than the
median of the worker’s friends. We see that conformity still exists, and clearly was
not driven by simply knowing more about other peers’ productivity. Nonetheless,
peers receiving unexpected relative ranks seemed to matter, but mostly for workers
who received negative feedback.
Conversely, for Private Treatment in column 3, we see absolutely no impact
of such specific information shocks; both the relevant coefficients are very small
in size. This is, of course, what we would expect because the Private Treatment
workers never received information about their peers’ ranks.
7 Alternative Explanations
One concern in the experimental design of this paper is whether the private rank-
ing treatment indeed remained private, or whether the Private Treatment workers
instead shared their rankings with others – effectively making the treatment public.
Note that, if Private Treatment workers shared their rankings with others, we would
not expect to see any differential responses between Private and Public Treatment
workers when they were more highly ranked than their friends (as shown in Table
5). The difference was particularly big and statistically significant when workers
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received positive feedback from treatment letters. This is inconsistent with infor-
mation sharing because we might expect them to share their rankings particularly
when they receive good news than when they receive bad news. Finally, in Table 7
column 3, we see that Public Treatment workers responded to new knowledge about
peers’ productivity, but the Private Treatment workers showed no such response; if
the ranking information were being shared, we would expect to see Private Treat-
ment workers responding to new information in a way similar to the responses of
the Public Treatment workers.
Could the evidence that we take as social conformity be explained by compla-
cency instead? Note that, in column 5 of Table 5, we found that a Public Treatment
worker reduced effort when he was ranked higher than his friends but the worker
did not reduce effort when he was ranked higher than peers with whom he did not
socialize. If what we interpreted as social-conformity effect was in fact driven by
complacency, we would expect to see similar reduction in effort even with respect
to peers with whom a worker did not socialize.
Column 5 of Table 5 rules out complacency among Public Treatment workers,
but what about in Private Treatment? Again, this is unlikely. In the Private
Treatment, we would expect a worker to be complacent when he receives a higher
ranking than he had expected (positive feedback). Recall that in Observation 1 we
had that conditional on H11(.) < 0, workers would decrease effort when they receive
positive feedback. This, in fact, can be interpreted as complacency effect. But
instead, the empirical evidence suggests the contrary: workers increased their effort
when given positive feedback, providing empirical support for H11 > 0 instead.
Finally, could any of the positive effect among workers be explained by fear
of getting fired? Again, note that we saw an increase in productivity only when
workers received positive feedback, while we saw a decrease in productivity when
workers received negative feedback. If any response were driven by fear of getting
fired, we would expect to see the opposite reaction. Moreover, the treatment letters
consistently reminded workers that the rankings would not have any effect on their
jobs.
8 Conclusion
Existing literature suggests that status incentives, in the form of performance-
based ranks, can increase worker productivity. However, the evidence in this paper
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indicates at least two reasons why this may not always be the case. A novel exper-
imental design with private and public ranking, along with detailed baseline data
on workers’ expected ranks and their social network, help to show that demoti-
vation and social conformity can strongly counteract the positive effects of status
motivation.
In particular, the evidence found in this paper indicates that if ranked privately,
demotivational effects are likely to offset at least some of the positive effects of
intrinsic-status incentives from ranks. If ranked publicly, workers’ preferences to
socially conform with their friends can lead to even worse results by offsetting the
weak positive effect from the additional social-status motivations. Nonetheless, the
results from this paper also suggest that rank incentives are more likely to increase
productivity on average if workers in a given context are highly competitive in
nature. Such competitive attitudes will offset the negative demotivational effect
from negative feedback, and, in turn, will complement the positive effect from
positive feedback. Similarly, social conformity effects will be diminished if there
are thinner social connections at a given workplace.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Wage based Ranks to Time Based Ranks
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Note: The figure shows how ranks computed from mean production wage per day in each month
(horizontal axis) correlates with actual time based ranks that were used in treatment letters (ver-
tical axis). ’20160X’ refers to calendar month ’X’ of year 2016.
Figure 2: Social Network Within Block and Outside Block
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Note: Left panel of the figure above plots the mean and median number of friends workers have
within their block, and rest of the floor outside their block. Instead of absolute numbers, the right
panel shows the share of workers that a worker is friends with within his block, and rest of the
floor.
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Figure 3: Difference in Expected Rank and True Rank
Overestimated Underestimated
0
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
.
02
D
en
si
ty
−100 −50 0 50 100
Expected Rank − Actual Baseline Wage Rank
Control Private Public
Overestimated Underestimated
0
.
00
2
.
00
4
.
00
6
.
00
8
.
01
D
en
si
ty
−100 −50 0 50 100
Expected Rank − Actual Rank in Feb’16
Control Private Public
Note: The first panel plots the distribution of difference between expected ranks as reported by
workers during baseline survey and their actual wage-based ranks during the baseline survey. The
second panel plots the distribution of difference between expected ranks as reported by workers
during baseline survey and the actual rank provided through treatment letter in first treatment
month. A negative value for this difference implies a worker overestimated his rank, while a positive
value implies he underestimated it.
Figure 4: Treatment Effect Across Months (Private Treatment)
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Note: The figure shows treatment effect in each month of the whole treatment period, conditional
on a worker receiving a negative feedback (left panel) or a positive feedback (right panel) in
the first treatment month. ’20160X’ on the horizontal axis refers to calendar month ’X’ of year
2016. Underlying regressions are similar to those used for main difference-in-difference analysis
and includes worker fixed effects, month fixed effects, style fixed effects and block size control.
Coefficients reported are only for Private Treatment. Errors are clustered at both worker and
year-month level. 90% confidence intervals around the coefficients are shown with dashed lines.
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Table 1: Key Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control Private Public
Block Category n n n Total
Category A (Private Intensive) 59 71 39 169
Category B (Public Intensive) 66 46 85 197
Total 125 117 124 366
Production Mean Mean Mean (1)-(2) (1)-(3)
Pre-Intervention Monthly Production Wage (Tk.) 10504.59 10453.06 10504.44 51.53 0.16
Pre-Intervention Mean Daily Wage (Tk.) 386.34 384.79 386.11 1.55 0.22
Pre-Intervention Monthly Attendance (days) 27.05 27.00 27.08 0.05 -0.02
Age on Jan 1, 2015 (years) 29.61 29.44 29.90 0.17 -0.29
Length of Tenure on Jan 1, 2015 (years) 4.32 4.47 4.28 -0.15 0.05
Social Network Mean Mean Mean (1)-(2) (1)-(3)
# of Operators in Block (Drafted) 24.55 24.61 24.63 -0.05 -0.08
# Peers (from block) Socially Interacts with 8.66 7.99 8.98 0.67 -0.32
# Peers (from block) Talks with >=3days/wk 12.65 13.34 14.33 -0.69 -1.68*
n n n Total
Chose Competitive Version of Ball-Bucket Game 56 58 51 165
Chose Non-Competitive Version of Ball-Bucket Game 69 56 73 198
Note: The table reports key descriptive statistics for each experimental group. The last two columns report the
differences in these statistics between control and the treatment groups. The difference is then tested against the null
that it is zero. *, **, *** indicate that the null is rejected at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
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Table 2: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage)
[A] Treatment * Post 0.000961 -0.000955
(0.00329) (0.00807)
[B] Treatment -0.00497
(0.0171)
[C] Private * Post -0.000519 0.00114
(0.00391) (0.0103)
[D] Public * Post 0.00238 -0.00292
(0.00621) (0.00858)
[E] Post 0.0278 0.0278
(0.0355) (0.0355)
[F] Private -0.00753
(0.0200)
[G] Public -0.00255
(0.0200)
[H] Block Size 6.65e-05 7.31e-05
(0.00121) (0.00121)
Constant 5.918*** 5.344*** 5.918*** 5.344***
(0.0291) (0.0450) (0.0291) (0.0455)
Observations 14,263 14,251 14,263 14,251
Adj. R-Sq. 0.002 0.796 0.002 0.796
N(Worker) 366 366 366 366
N(Months) 46 46 46 46
FE: Worker, Year-Month, Style NO YES NO YES
Note: Dependent variable is log of mean daily wage. In Cols 1-2 Private and Public treatment
groups are pooled together as one Treatment group, while in Cols 3-4 they are tested sepa-
rately. Pre-treatment months are Jan’13 - Jan’15, while post-treatment months are Feb’15
- Oct’15. Standard errors are clustered at both worker and month level. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
36
Table 3: Motivation/Demotivation Effect from Revelation of True Ranks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage)
Positive Negative Cols Positive Negative Cols
Feedback Feedback [1] - [2] Feedback Feedback [3] - [4]
(δ0 < 0) (δ0 > 0) (δ0 < 0) (δ0 > 0)
Private * Post 0.0269*** -0.0130** 0.0399*** 0.0230* -0.0139 0.0398**
(0.0077) (0.0057) (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0103) (0.0164)
Post 0.0168 0.0350
(0.0353) (0.0356)
Private -0.0129 -0.0041
(0.0338) (0.0276)
Observations 3,279 5,298 8,577 3,278 5,293 8,571
Adj. R-Sq. 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.785 0.779 0.782
N(Worker) 82 139 242 82 139 221
N(Months) 46 46 46 46 46 46
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE: Worker, Year-Month, Style NO NO NO YES YES YES
Additional Control: Block Size NO NO NO YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable is log of mean daily wage. Positive Feedback (Negative Feedback) refers to a worker whose
rank in the first treatment month was higher (lower) than his expected rank. δ0 refers to noise parameter used in
the theoretical framework; it refers to the noise in a worker’s perceived rank prior to the experiment. Workers from
Public Treatment are excluded from the sample. Sample period contains 46 months (pre-treatment: Jan’13 - Jan’15;
post-treatment: Feb’15 - Oct’15). Standard errors are clustered at both worker and month level. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
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Table 4: Conformity towards Friends - With Baseline Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage)
[A] Private * Post -0.000519 -0.0030 -0.0004 0.0040
(0.00391) (0.0046) (0.0064) (0.0106)
[B] Public * Post 0.00238 0.0274** 0.0285*** 0.0128
(0.00621) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0085)
[C] Private * Post * 1(Base. Prod. > Median among Friends) -0.0059 -0.0118
(0.0144) (0.0185)
[D] Public * Post * 1(Base. Prod. > Median among Friends) -0.0594*** -0.0626*** -0.0453***
(0.0155) (0.0133) (0.0146)
[E] Post 0.0278 0.0224 0.0213
(0.0355) (0.0364) (0.0361)
[F] Post * 1(Base. Prod. > Median among Friends) 0.0122 0.0153** 0.0194*
(0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0111)
Observations 14,263 14,263 14,263 14,251
Adj. R-Sq. 0.002 0.096 0.097 0.782
N(Worker) 366 366 366 366
Constant YES YES YES YES
FE: Worker, Year-Month, Style NO NO NO YES
Other Controls NO NO NO YES
B + D -0.0321*** -0.0340*** -0.0325***
(0.0089) (0.0071) (0.0104)
Social Conformity Effect: (B + D) - (A + C) -0.0278** -0.0246**
(0.0118) (0.0125)
Note: Dependent variable is log of mean daily wage. 1(Base. Prod. > Median among Friends) is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if pre-treatment productivity of a worker (measured as mean daily wage over the whole pre-treatment period) is
higher than the median pre-treatment productivity among all of his friends (the worker himself included) who are from the
same block and in the same treatment. Pre-treatment months are Jan’13 - Jan’15, while post-treatment months are Feb’15 -
Oct’15. Standard errors are clustered at both worker and month level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% significance level respectively.
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Table 5: Conformity towards Friends - With Ranks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Cols Ln(Wage)
Pos. Feed. Neg. Feed. [2] - [3]
[A] Private * Post -0.0028 0.0297* -0.0211** 0.0519** -0.0071
(0.0083) (0.0161) (0.0103) (0.0188) (0.0090)
[B] Public * Post 0.0088 0.0306* -0.0064 0.0392* 0.0064
(0.0092) (0.0157) (0.0120) (0.0222) (0.0099)
[C] Private * Post * 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Friends in Block] 0.0042 -0.0197 0.0155 -0.0346 -0.0015
(0.0109) (0.0212) (0.0122) (0.0219) (0.0122)
[D] Public * Post * 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Friends in Block] -0.0355** -0.0651*** -0.0142 -0.0489 -0.0399***
(0.0142) (0.0216) (0.0223) (0.0323) (0.0146)
[E] Private * Post * 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Non-Friends in Block] 0.0157
(0.0142)
[F] Public * Post * 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Non-Friends in Block] 0.0093
(0.0103)
[G] Post * 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Friends of Friends in Block] 0.0274*** 0.0309*** 0.0224 0.0245***
(0.0076) (0.0115) (0.0146) (0.0086)
[H] Post * 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Non-Friends in Block] 0.0070
(0.0082)
Observations 13,745 4,654 7,987 13,745
N(Worker) 366 120 216 366
N(Months) 45 45 45 45
Constant YES YES YES YES
FE: Worker, Year-Month, Style YES YES YES YES
Other Controls YES YES YES YES
Social Conformity Effect: (E+H)-(A+D) -0.0281*** -0.0445** -0.0149
(0.0097) (0.0184) (0.0128)
Note: 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Friends in Block] is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a worker was ranked higher than the median rank
among his friends (from the same block and same treatment group) in the previous month. 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Non-Friends in Block] is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a worker was ranked, in the previous month, higher than the median rank of all same-treatment and
same-block peers that he is not friends with. All regressions include constant. Standard errors are clustered at both worker and month level. *,
**, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
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Table 6: Fightback from Competitive Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage)
Pos.Feed. Neg.Feed.
[A] Private * Post -0.00657 0.0194 -0.0373**
(0.0100) (0.0140) (0.0149)
[B] Private * Post * Competitive 0.0195 0.0109 0.0449**
(0.0161) (0.0236) (0.0210)
[C] Public * Post -0.0150* 0.00323 -0.0316***
(0.00846) (0.0124) (0.0115)
[D] Public * Post * Competitive 0.0281* 0.00606 0.0423**
(0.0151) (0.0274) (0.0190)
[E] Post * Competitive -0.0130 0.0228 -0.0410***
(0.0105) (0.0169) (0.0144)
Observations 14,118 4,813 8,287
N(Worker) 363 120 216
Constant YES YES YES
FE: Worker, Year-Month, Style YES YES YES
Other Controls: Block Size YES YES YES
[A] + [B] 0.0130 0.0303 0.0076
(0.0121) (0.0200) (0.0140)
[C]+[D] 0.0131 0.0093 0.0107
(0.0108) (0.0220) (0.0130)
Note: Competitive is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a worker chose
to get paid through the competitive version of ball-bucket game played during
baseline survey. It takes the value 0 if he chose to get paid though uncompetitive
piece rate. All regressions include constant, not reported for brevity. Standard
errors are clustered at both worker and month level. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
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Table 7: Knowing Others’ Ranks
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Wage/Day) Ln(Wage/Day) Ln(Wage/Day)
Public Public Private
Treatment * Post 0.00604 0.0233 0.0118
(0.0106) (0.0172) (0.0127)
Treatment * Post * (# Peers Unexpectedly Ranked Lower in Prev. Mth.) -0.0130*** -0.0106** -0.00682
(0.00497) (0.00493) (0.00751)
Treatment * Post * (# Peers Unexpectedly Ranked Higher in Prev. Mth.) 0.000524 -0.00347 -0.00381
(0.00454) (0.00547) (0.00479)
Treatment * Post * 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Friends in Block] -0.0352**
(0.0167)
Post * (# Peers Unexpectedly Ranked Lower in Prev. Mth.) 0.0114*** 0.00977** 0.0113***
(0.00433) (0.00423) (0.00401)
Post * (# Peers Unexpectedly Ranked Higher in Prev. Mth.) -0.00365 -0.000574 -0.00300
(0.00322) (0.00395) (0.00316)
Post * 1[Rankt−1 > Median of Friends in Block] 0.0213**
(0.00909)
Observations 9,702 9,361 9,437
N(Worker) 249 249 242
Constant YES YES YES
FE: Worker, Year-Month, Style YES YES YES
Other Controls: Block Size YES YES YES
Note: (# Peers Unexpectedly Ranked Lower in Prev. Mth.) refers to number of peers from same block who a worker thought ranked higher
than him during baseline survey but got ranked lower than him in previous month’s rank during treatment period. Similarly for (# Peers
Unexpectedly Ranked Higher in Prev. Mth.). All regressions include constant, not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at both
worker and month level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Theoretical Observations
A.1 Observation 1
Let e∗io represent the equilibrium level of effort exerted by worker i in t = 0, which
therefore solves Equation 3. Therefore:
∂U(e∗i0, .)
∂ei0
=
∫ [
W1(e
∗
io + i) +
n− 1
n
H1(z
∗
i0)
]
g(i)di − C1(e∗i0, αi) = 0 (6)
where, z∗it = e
∗
io + i − 1n
∑
j e
∗
j,t + δi0. I suppress the time subscript in it since
the i.i.d. values for  are drawn from the same distribution of  in each period.
While computing expectation over all possible values of , the subscript becomes
redundant.
Once the true ranks are revealed in t = 1, if worker i keeps his effort at e∗io and
takes as given e∗−i,o, the net marginal utility evaluated at e
∗
io is:
∂U(e∗i0, .)
∂ei1
=
∫ [
W1(e
∗
io + i) +
n− 1
n
H1(z
∗
i0 − δio)
]
g(i)di − C1(e∗i0, αi) (7)
Notice that H1(.) is now evaluated at (z
∗
i0 − δio) which is the revised perceived
rank for t = 1 at e∗io. Letting ∆ be the difference of (7)-(6), and using first order
Taylor expansion we have:
∆i = −δi0n− 1
n
∫
H11(z
∗
i0)g(i)di (8)
Therefore, in t = 1, holding everyone else’s effort fixed at e∗−i,0, if ∆i > 0, the
marginal benefit at effort level e∗i0 in t = 1 outweighs the marginal cost of effort
at e∗i0.
32 Hence, in t = 1 worker i will increase his effort from e∗i0. Conversely, if
∆i < 0, in t = 1 he will decrease his effort from e
∗
i0. But whether ∆i is positive or
negative depends on the signs of both δi0 and H11(.).
Case 1: H11(.) > 0
32Because of the assumption on interior solution (E[W11(.) + (
n−1
n
)2H11(.)] < C11(.)) this dif-
ference between marginal benefit and marginal cost diminishes as effort goes up.
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Under the case where H11 > 0, the value of the integral in Equation 8 is positive.
If δi0 < 0, ∆i > 0 and hence worker i increases his effort in t = 1 relative to t = 0.
Conversely, if δi0 < 0, he decreases his effort.
Case 2: H11(.) < 0
Under the case whereH11 < 0, the value of the integral in Equation 8 is negative.
Now, if δi0 < 0, ∆i < 0 and hence worker i decreases his effort in t = 1 relative to
t = 0. Conversely, if δi0 > 0, he increases his effort.
It is also easy to see that when δi0 = 0, irrespective of the sign of H11(.), ∆i = 0.
Hence, worker i exerts the same level of effort in t = 1 that he does in t = 0.
The above proofs rely on the assumption that a given worker takes everyone
else’s effort constant. It is safe to make this assumption because when we start
with e∗io, it already considers an equilibrium response from other workers in period
t = 0, however that equilibrium is determined. Moreover, in t = 1, to solve for the
equilibrium, a worker would need to know δ−i,0 and α−i, both of which are private
information. He could try to infer δ−i,0 > 0 if he had known how others’ ranks
change once the intervention was introduced, but the scope to learn is limited. Any
variation in his own rank, the only thing he observes, would be caused by it as
well as e−i,t, and −i,t; hence variation in his own rank alone contains very little
information.
A.2 Observation 2
When the firm chooses to rank workers privately, the results are similar as before
when workers were driven by only self-image concerns. Therefore, in t = 1 the first
order condition for a privately ranked worker is given by:∫ [
W1(e˜it) +
n− 1
n
H1(zi1)
]
g(it)dit − C1(eit, αi) = 0 (9)
where, zi1 = zi0 − δi0. Let e∗pvt solve the above equation for a privately ranked
worker in t = 1.
When the firm chooses to rank workers publicly, in t = 1 the first order condition
is given by:∫ [
W1(e˜it) +
n− 1
n
(1 + si)H1(zi1)−M1(e˜i,t−1 − e˜fi,t−1)
]
g(it)dit −C1(eit, αi) = 0
(10)
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Let e∗pub solve the above equation for a publicly ranked worker in t = 1.
Ceteris peribus, the difference between LHS of Equation 10 and LHS of Equation
9 is the difference in marginal incentives between Public and Private ranking. It is
given by the following:
∆ˆ =
∫ [n− 1
n
siH1(zi1)−M1(e˜i,t−1 − e˜fi,t−1)
]
g(it)dit (11)
The first part of RHS in Equation 11 is the change in social-status utility from
one additional unit of effort, while the second part is the disutility of outperforming
friends from one additional unit of effort.
Let x = e˜i,t−1 − e˜fi,t−1. Recall that H1(.) > 0 and M1(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0 by
assumption. Also, assumption for interior solution states that ∂
2M(.)
∂e2it
> si
∂2H(.)
∂e2it
,
which translates to M11(.) >
(
n−1
n
)2
siH11(.). Hence, at e
∗
pvt, by the first two
assumptions, ∆ˆ > 0 for x ≤ 0. Because of the third assumption which implies that
∆ˆ will fall with increase in effort, a publicly ranked worker will exert effort higher
than e∗pvt. In other words, when a publicly ranked worker is not ranked higher than
his friends in the previous period (x ≤ 0), he exerts more effort than a privately
ranked worker because of social-status return on his effort (e∗pub > e
∗
pvt).
To understand what happens when x increases from x = 0, first note that:
∂∆ˆ
∂x
=
∫
−M11(.)g(it)dit < 0
The last inequality follows from the assumption thatM11(.) > 0. In other words,
comparing across workers when all of them are ranked publicly, e∗pub,i > e
∗
pub,j when
xi < xj .
Therefore, since ∆ˆ is continuously decreasing in x, there exists a value x˜ > 0
such that, e∗pub < e
∗
pvt if x > x˜.
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